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BLD-284        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2705 
 ___________ 
 
 IN RE:  KELLEY TROY COOLEY, 
        Petitioner 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
 United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (Related to D.C. Civ. No. 1:07-cv-00208) 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
 September 8, 2011 
 
 Before:  SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges  
 
 (Opinion filed September 27, 2011) 
 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Kelley Troy Cooley, a Pennsylvania state prisoner proceeding pro se, petitions this 
Court for a writ of mandamus (1) ordering the recusal of the presiding District Court 
Judge in his pending civil rights action, and (2) directing the District Court to address his 
objections to a Magistrate Judge’s report issued in that case.  For the reasons that follow, 
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we will deny the petition. 
I. 
 In August 2007, Cooley filed a pro se complaint in the District Court pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  He later amended his complaint in May 2008.  All told, his pleadings, 
which raised claims of excessive force, among other claims, named ten defendants:  Erie 
County, County Executive Mark DiVecchio, Erie County Sheriff Robert Merski, Sheriff 
Marty Davis, Lieutenant Paul Greiner, and Deputy Sheriffs Anthony Bowers, Charles 
Bowers, Jay Wieczorek, Roger Gunesch, and David Stucke. 
 In July 2008, Defendants Erie County and DiVecchio moved for summary 
judgment.  The Magistrate Judge recommended that the court grant the motion, and the 
court adopted that recommendation in March 2009.  In February 2010, the remaining 
defendants (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the Sheriff Defendants”) moved for 
summary judgment.  In August 2010, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the court 
grant that motion in part and deny it in part, concluding that Cooley’s Eighth Amendment 
excessive force claims survived summary judgment as to six of the Sheriff Defendants.  
The Sheriff Defendants filed “exceptions” to the Magistrate Judge’s report, and moved to 
supplement the record.  The District Court granted the request to supplement, and 
recommitted the matter to the Magistrate Judge. 
 In March 2011, the Magistrate Judge issued a supplemental report, echoing her 
recommendation from her original report.  On April 29, 2011, the District Court entered 
an order adopting both the report and the supplemental report.  Cooley then moved for 
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reconsideration of that order, and requested that the presiding District Court Judge, the 
Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr., recuse himself.  While that motion was pending, 
Cooley filed the instant mandamus petition.  On July 8, 2011, the District Court denied 
Cooley’s motion for reconsideration and request to recuse.  The surviving claims from 
Cooley’s pleadings remain pending before the District Court. 
 In his mandamus petition, Cooley claims that the District Court never addressed 
objections he made to the Magistrate Judge’s August 2010 report.  Cooley seeks an order 
directing the District Court to consider those objections, as well as an order compelling 
Judge Cohill to recuse himself. 
II. 
 A writ of mandamus is a drastic remedy available only in extraordinary cases.  See 
In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 2005).  A petitioner 
seeking mandamus relief must show that “(1) no other adequate means exist to attain the 
relief he desires, (2) the party’s right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable, and 
(3) the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.”  Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 
705, 710 (2010) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  As we have  
previously explained, “[m]andamus is a proper means for this court to review a district 
court judge’s refusal to recuse from a case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), where the 
judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”  Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, 
Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 163 (3d Cir. 1993).  Where, as here, the mandamus petition is filed 
before the district court rules on the recusal motion, we review the subsequent denial of 
4 
 
that motion for abuse of discretion.  See In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 301 
(3d Cir. 2004).    
 Cooley has not established that mandamus relief is warranted here.  First, his 
claim that the District Court failed to consider his objections to the Magistrate Judge’s 
August 2010 report may be raised on appeal once a final order has been issued in his 
case.  Second, Cooley has not established that Judge Cohill abused his discretion in 
refusing to recuse himself.  Cooley’s allegation that Judge Cohill made “ex parte 
decisions which appears [sic] to be favoritism for the Respondent’s [sic]” is wholly 
unsubstantiated, and Cooley’s claim that Judge Cohill failed to consider the above-
referenced objections to the Magistrate Judge’s report, without more, is not a sufficient 
basis to warrant recusal.  See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“Almost 
invariably, [judicial rulings] are proper grounds for appeal, not for recusal.”).  Simply 
put, Cooley has failed to establish that “a reasonable person, with knowledge of all the 
facts, would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”  See 
In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d at 301 (reciting test for recusal under § 455(a)). 
 In light of the above, we will deny Cooley’s petition for a writ of mandamus.  
Cooley’s motion to stay the District Court proceedings pending the resolution of this 
mandamus petition is denied.  
